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Competition and Quality in Regulated Markets 





We investigate the effect of competition on quality in regulated markets (e.g., health care, 
higher education, public utilities), using a Hotelling framework, in the presence of sluggish 
demand. We take a differential-game approach, and derive the open-loop solution (providers 
choose the optimal quality investment plan based on demand at the initial period) and the 
feedback closed-loop solution (providers observe demand in each period and choose quality 
in response to current demand). If production costs are strictly convex, the steady state quality 
is higher under the open-loop solution than under the feedback solution. In both solutions, 
quality and demand move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the 
steady state. While fiercer competition (lower transportation costs or less sluggish demand) 
leads to higher quality in both solutions, the quality response to increased competition is 
weaker when players use feedback strategies. 
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Competition leads to better quality when prices are regulated. This is a fairly
robust prediction from economic theory.1;2 Given that the regulated price is above
the marginal costs, ￿rms have an incentive to invest in quality in order to attract
(or avoid losing) consumers. Tougher competition ￿measured for instance by the
number of competing ￿rms or by the degree of substitutability among products ￿
ampli￿es the incentives to invest in quality. Prime examples of the types of regulated
industries we have in mind are health care and education, where consumer choices ￿
at least in most European countries ￿are mainly driven by considerations of quality
rather than price.
In theoretical models, the positive relationship between competition and quality
in regulated markets is generally derived within a static framework, neglecting po-
tentially important dynamic issues related to quality. In particular, static models
assume that demand responds immediately to quality changes. This assumption is
unrealistic. Demand tends to be sluggish. If a provider increases quality, sluggish
demand implies that it will take some time before the potential demand increase is
fully realised. Such demand sluggishness can typically arise for two di⁄erent reasons.
First, imperfect information on the demand side, which is particularly relevant in
markets where quality is the main competition variable: while prices usually are
easily and immediately observable, quality is often less readily observable and much
more di¢ cult to measure. Second, sticky behaviour of consumers, motivated by
(personal or familiar) habits, or by trust or con￿dence in one speci￿c provider. Let
us think, for example, of the cases of people who choose a dentist simply because
relatives went to her/him; or a child going to a speci￿c school (or college) simply
because brothers went there. Moreover, the relational content in the service ex-
change between a provider and a consumer in ￿elds like education or health play an
important role in making demand sluggish.3
Our basic framework is the widely-used Hotelling model for quality competition
with regulated prices.4 In this model there are two ￿rms o⁄ering one product each.
1See, for instance, the survey by Gaynor (2006) and references therein. See also the papers by
Ma and Burgess (1993), Wolinsky (1997), and Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006). See also
Lambertini (2006) for theoretical analyses of vertical di⁄erentiation in industrial organization.
2If ￿rms can set prices as well, the e⁄ect of competition on quality is in general ambiguous. In
this case, competition depresses prices and, thus, the marginal revenues from quality investment
(see e.g., Economides, 1993).
3Brekke, Cellini, Siciliani and Straume (2008) investigate a di⁄erent dynamic issue. They assume
that demand responds instantaneously to quality but quality is a stock variable, which increases
over time only if investment in quality is higher than its deterioration rate.
4See, for instance, Ma and Burgess (1993), Calem and Rizzo (1995), Wolinsky (1997), Lyon
(1999), Del Rey (2001), Beitia (2003), Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007), and De Fraja
and Landeraas (2006).
2We consider the case in which the spatial locations are given, while the products are
horizontally and vertically di⁄erentiated, and the ￿rms choose quality to maximise
pro￿ts. These quality choices are modelled in a dynamic framework under the key
assumption that demand adjusts sluggishly. We model sluggish demand such that,
at each point in time, only a fraction of consumers respond to quality changes. Thus,
it will take some time before potential demand is fully realised. The time it takes
for potential and actual demand to align is determined by the degree of demand
sluggishness.
We use a di⁄erential-game approach to analyse dynamic competition between
the two ￿rms.5 There are two main solution concepts. First, we derive the open-
loop solution, where each ￿rm commits to an optimal (quality) investment plan at
the initial period. This solution is reasonable if it is very di¢ cult or costly to obtain
information about competitors and/or the quality variable is subject to some rigidity
(e.g., investment regulations). Second, we derive the feedback (closed-loop) solution,
where each ￿rm knows the quality of the competitor at each point in time, not just
the initial state. Here, ￿rms choose an optimal rule connecting the current value
of their choice variable to the current value of states. The fundamental di⁄erence
between the two solution concepts is the degree of commitment, but the feedback
solution is also sometimes interpreted as a more competitive solution in the sense
that ￿rms can at each point in time change their investments in response to the
dynamics of the states.6
Our main result is that if production costs are strictly convex in output, quality
is lower in the feedback than in the open-loop solution. The reason is that quality
choices are strategic complements in this case. In a dynamic game, this provides
an incentive to compete less aggressively. Otherwise, if production costs are linear
in output, quality choices become strategically independent, and the two solutions
￿open-loop and feedback ￿coincide. In both solutions, the steady state level of
quality is increasing in price level and decreasing in level of transportation costs
and the degree of demand sluggishness, as expected. Thus, the positive relationship
between competition and quality is con￿rmed also in a dynamic setting. More
interesting, perhaps, is that the quality response to increased competition is weaker
5See Dockner, Jłrgensen, Van Long and Sorger (2000) for an introduction. The Hotelling model
in a di⁄erential game framework is used, inter alia, by Laussel, de Montmarin and Van Long
(2004) and by Piga (1998). Di⁄erently from our present paper, however, the former focuses on
network e⁄ects and competition is on prices (rather than quality), while the latter studies the role
of advertising and price competition.
6In dynamic capital accumulation games the closed-loop solution is typically more competitive
(see Dockner, 1992; Dockner, Jłrgensen, Van Long and Sorger, 2000). In these models, providers
compete a la Cournot but face capacity constraints that can be relaxed by capital accumulation
through investments. It turns out that investments under the closed-loop solution is higher than
under open-loop.
3in the feedback solution, compared with the open-loop equilibrium.
A second main ￿nding is that demand and quality move in opposite directions
over time on the equilibrium path to the steady state, given that production costs
are strictly convex. This result contradicts the static relationship between quality
and demand. Consider a situation where actual demand is below the steady-state
level. In this situation, the provider will raise quality above the steady-state level.
However, as demand increases, the marginal pro￿t gain becomes lower due to increas-
ing marginal costs, and the provider will gradually reduce quality until the steady
state is reached. As a result, we obtain a negative relationship between (actual)
demand and quality. This result might have implications for empirical studies. Un-
less su¢ cient care is taken to account for dynamic adjustment over time, this kind
of equilibrium dynamics could potentially lead to spurious relationships between
quality and demand.
We also consider welfare and policy implications. Deriving the ￿rst-best quality
path over time, we show that there is a trade-o⁄between improving allocative (cost)
e¢ ciency and increasing consumer bene￿t from quality investments. If the former
incentive dominates, the ￿rst-best solution prescribes a lower quality level for the
provider with the higher demand, implying that ￿rst-best quality and demand always
move in the same direction over time. The strengths of these two incentives depend
on production cost convexity and demand sluggishness. If demand is su¢ ciently
sluggish, the latter incentive dominates, implying that ￿rst-best quality and demand
move in opposite direction over time. We show how the ￿rst-best quality path can be
implemented by dynamic price regulation, where the regulator sets time-dependent
and provider-speci￿c prices. Finally, we point out that demand sluggishness might
be a⁄ected by regulatory policy as well. The regulator might spend resources on
publishing quality indicators of the providers. If this is the case, then reducing
demand sluggishness is a policy substitute to providing high-powered incentives
We believe our analysis is relevant for several regulated industries. A prime
example is health care. In this industry prices are either set by the insurer (gov-
ernment or private insurer) or settled in negotiations with the providers (hospitals
and physicians). Consumers (patients) are insured against medical expenditures, so
non-price measures like quality and distance are more relevant for provider choice
than price.7 Since health care providers typically receive payments per patient (or
per treatment), they might ￿nd it pro￿table to improve quality to attract (or avoid
losing) patients and, in turn, increase revenues.8
7The empirical studies by Kessler and McClellan (2000) and Tay (2003) show that distance and
quality are the main predictors of hospital choice. These papers also assess the relationship between
competition and quality in the US Medicare hospital market.
8Related theoretical studies on competition in health care are, for instance, Calem and Rizzo
4Another example is the market for (especially higher) education. In most Eu-
ropean countries, tuition fees play a negligible role, and funding of educational in-
stitutions is to a large extent based on student attendances.9 A student￿ s choice of
school or university is typically based on the quality of the institution, as well as
the institution￿ s location (geographically and/or in product space). As for hospitals,
universities might ￿nd it pro￿table to invest in quality (new facilities, better labo-
ratories, hiring of top researchers, etc.) in order to attract more students, thereby
increasing revenues.10
In both health care and education, quality is a major concern. In recent years,
many European countries have implemented marked-based reforms exposing providers
to competition. In particular, the introduction of provider choice and activity-based
payments are aimed at stimulating competition and in turn quality. For example,
in the UK, hospitals are paid a tari⁄ for every patients treated (Payment by Re-
sults): providers who attract more patients receive more resources (money follows
the patient). Similar initiatives have been introduced in Norway, Denmark, Italy and
several other European countries. Our study is also relevant for the US Medicare
system, where hospitals are paid a ￿xed price per treatment within a speci￿c di-
agnosis related group (DRG), a system that has been adopted by many European
countries.
In both sectors, governments spend resources on collecting information on quality
indicators and publishing scores and rankings of institutions (e.g., league tables of
hospitals, universities, schools, etc.). Obviously, the main purpose of this activity is
to make demand more responsive to quality di⁄erences. Our purpose is to contribute
to the understanding of the impact of competition on quality in regulated markets
characterised by demand sluggishness.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we present the model
framework. In Section 3 we derive and characterise the equilibrium quality under
the open-loop solution, while a corresponding analysis for the feedback solution is
provided in Section 4. Welfare and policy implications are presented in Section 5.
In Section 6 we extend the model to the case of elastic market demand. Section 7
concludes the paper.
(1995); Lyon (1999); Gravelle (2000); Gravelle and Masiero (2000); Beitia (2003); Nuscheler (2003);
Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume (2006, 2007); and Karlsson (2007).
9See Kaiser, Raymond, Koelman and van Vught (1992) for an overview.
10For related theoretical studies in education, see papers by Del Rey (2001), De Fraja and Ioassa
(2001), and De Fraja and Landeras (2006). For empirical studies on competition and quality in
education, see e.g., Dee (1998), Epple and Romano (1998) and Hoxby (2000).
52 Model
In line with previous literature on quality competition in regulated markets, we
conduct the analysis within a Hotelling framework (Hotelling, 1929). Consider a
market with two providers located (exogenously) at either end of the unit line S =
[0;1].11;12 On this line segment there is a uniform distribution of individuals, with
total mass normalised to 1. We assume unit demand, where each individual demands
one unit of output. The utility of an individual who is located at x 2 S and chooses
provider i, located at zi, is given by
U (x;zi) = v + kqi ￿ ￿ jx ￿ zij; (1)
where v is the gross valuation from consumption, qi ￿ q is the quality at provider i, k
is a parameter measuring the (marginal) utility of quality, and ￿ is a transportation
cost parameter.13 The lower bound q on quality represents the minimum quality
providers are allowed to o⁄er.14 For simplicity, we set q = 0. Moreover, we normalise
the marginal utility of quality to one, i.e., k = 1, without loss of generality. This
implies that ￿ can be interpreted as the marginal disutility of travelling relative
to quality. Thus, a low (high) ￿ means that quality is of relatively more (less)
importance to the patient than travelling distance.
Since the distance between providers is equal to one (exogenously ￿xed), the
individual who is indi⁄erent between provider i and provider j is located at D￿,
given by
v ￿ ￿D￿ + qi = v ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ D￿) + qj; (2)
11S is typically interpreted either as a geographical space or a product (taste) space.
12A limiting assumption in our analysis is that locations are exogenous. In our dynamic setting,
allowing for endogenous locations will severely complicate the analysis (see Brekke, Nuscheler and
Straume, 2006, for a static analysis with endogenous locations and qualities). However, the assump-
tion of exogenous locations is arguably closer to reality in the particular sectors that we consider to
be our main applications, such as health care and education. For example, locations of hospitals or
universities are typically ￿xed in all but the very long run. Even in the long run, location choices
might also be restricted due to regulation.
13The assumption that k is the same for all consumers implies (along with the other symmetry
assumptions) that there will be no vertical di⁄erentiation in the steady state equilibrium (though
there will be vertical di⁄erentiation on the equilibrium dynamic path to the steady state). We stick
to this assumption for two reasons. Most importantly, introducing consumer heterogeneity along
the vertical dimension (as, for example, in Neven and Thisse, 1990) will severely complicate the
analysis. Furthermore, by keeping k constant across consumers, our model is more in line with the
previously mentioned (static) analyses of quality competition with ￿xed prices.
14We can think of q as the minimum quality level set by a regulator and/or de￿ned through
legislation. If q < q, the provider might be sued or lose his licence. In health care, we can think of
q < q as malpractice or failure to meet licence standards.








implying that the provider with a higher quality has a potential demand in excess
of 1=2. Notice how lower transportation costs make it less costly for consumers
to switch between providers, increasing the demand responsiveness to changes in
quality.15
In the existing literature, it is typically assumed that demand responds instanta-
neously to quality changes. This is obviously a simplifying assumption. Demand is
generally sluggish. If a provider increases quality, sluggish demand responses imply
that it will take some time before the potential demand increase is fully realised.
Such demand sluggishness can typically arise from imperfect information on the
demand side, which is particularly relevant in markets where quality is the main
competition variable. While prices usually are easily and immediately observable,
quality is often much more di¢ cult to measure and thus less readily observable. For
example, assume that, at each point in time, only a proportion ￿ 2 [0;1] of con-
sumers become aware of quality changes in the market. This would imply that, at
each point in time, only a fraction ￿ of any potential change in demand is realised.
A di⁄erent set of reasons why demand is sluggish has to do with personal or familiar
habits in ￿elds like education or health: people trust in one speci￿c provider, for
personal or familiar considerations, apart from the objective quality of the service;
sticky behaviour, and in some cases even addiction to a speci￿c provider, lead to
sluggish demand.
De￿ne D(t) as the actual demand of provider i at time t (as opposed to potential





D(t) = ￿(D￿(t) ￿ D(t)); (4)
where ￿ 2 [0;1] is an inverse measure of demand sluggishness. The higher is ￿, the
less sluggish is demand. If ￿ = 0, the demand facing each provider is completely
inelastic, as actual demand does not respond to quality changes, while, if ￿ = 1,
potential demand changes are immediately and fully realised. Such a speci￿cation
is widely used in theoretical IO models to describe market price stickiness (see, e.g.,
15Notice that our assumption of maximal di⁄erentiation (i.e., locations at the endpoints of the
Hotelling line) is not crucial for our results. In fact, any pair of symmetric locations would give
exactly the same potential demand function as (3). Furthermore, even for asymmetric locations, the
marginal e⁄ect of quality on potential demand (@D
￿=@qi) is identical as long as the transportation
cost function is linear in distance.
7Simaan and Takayama, 1978; Fershtman and Kamien, 1987; Dockner et al., 2000
Sect. 10.1; Cellini and Lambertini, 2007).
Since market demand is inelastic, notice that both providers face the same dy-
namic constraint, given by (4). To see this, notice that actual demand for provider
j at time t is given by 1 ￿ D(t) (as opposed to potential demand 1 ￿ D￿(t)). Ana-
lytically, the law of motion of actual demand for provider j is then given by
d[1 ￿ D(t)]
dt
= ￿ [(1 ￿ D￿(t)) ￿ (1 ￿ D(t))]; (5)
which can easily be rewritten as (4). Thus, the dynamics of the demand for provider
i automatically determines the demand for provider j.16
We assume that providers maximise pro￿ts. The instantaneous objective func-
tion of provider i is assumed to be given by
￿i (t) = T + pD(t) ￿ C (D(t);qi (t)) ￿ F; (6)
where p is a regulated price per unit of output provided (for example, a treatment or
a patient in the context of health care markets; a student in the context of education
markets).17 T is a potential lump-sum transfer (or a ￿xed grant/budget) received
from a third-party payer.
On the cost-side, each provider i faces a ￿xed cost F and variable cost C(￿) that
depends on the quality qi and the actual demand D. For simplicity, we assume that









where ￿ > 0 and ￿ ￿ 0. Thus, production costs are increasing and strictly convex in
quality, while increasing and weakly convex in output.18 Notice that the case where
production costs are linear in output is captured by setting ￿ = 0.19
16In Section 6 we extend the model to allow for elastic market demand.
17As long as prices are ￿xed, whether payments are collected directly from the consumers (as for
public utilities) or from a third-party payer (which is more relevant for health care and, to a certain
extent, education markets) is immaterial for our results.
18We make the simplifying assumption that the cost function is separable in quality and output:
CDqi = 0. The assumption of cost separability between quality and quantity is widely used in the
related literature (see, e.g., Economides, 1989, 1993; Calem and Rizzo, 1995; Lyon, 1999; Gravelle
and Masiero, 2000; Nuscheler, 2003; Brekke, Nuscheler and Straume, 2006, 2007). Relaxing the
cost separability assumption should not qualitatively a⁄ect our results as long as CDD > jCDqij:







2 (i.e., adding the term
￿D to (7)) is captured by re-de￿ning the parameter p in (6) as p := e p￿￿, where e p is the regulated
per-unit price received by the provider. The case of a constant marginal production cost ￿ > 0 is
then obtained by setting ￿ = 0.
8De￿ning ￿ as the (constant) preference discount rate, the provider￿ s objective




In reality, providers may not have an in￿nite-time horizon, but may have reasonably
long ￿nite horizons. If the optimal path does not di⁄er signi￿cantly from the solution
with a very large but ￿nite horizon, the convenience of working with an in￿nite-
horizon model may be worth the loss of realism (see LØonard and van Long, 1992, p.
285). Also, when decision-makers retire, they may well be replaced by other decision-
makers with similar utility functions, thus generating an in￿nite-time horizon.
In this type of dynamic models with strategic interactions ￿ i.e., di⁄erential
games ￿there are two main solution concepts for the Nash equilibrium: a) open-
loop solution, where each provider knows the initial state of the system and then
nothing else, i.e., each provider knows the initial quality (and thus potential demand)
of the other provider, but not in the following periods; b) closed-loop solution, where
each provider knows the initial state of the system, but also later knows the state
variable values, i.e., each provider knows the quality of the other provider, not only
in the initial state, but also in all of the subsequent periods. Within the closed-
loop solutions, further distinctions can be made: if one assumes that players take
into account only the initial state and the current state, the ￿ memoryless￿closed-
loop solution is obtained; if players take into account the whole history of states,
the ￿ perfect state￿closed-loop is obtained; ￿nally, if players in each instant take
into account the current value of states (i.e., the whole past history is summarised
by the current value of states), the feedback rule is obtained, and this is a case
of stationary Markovian strategy. A strategy is said to be Markovian if the rule
(i.e., the function) connecting the choice variable x(t) to the states y(t) is of type
x(t) = f(y(t);t), i.e., the choice variables depend on the current value of states but
not on the path followed by the states until t. If x(t) = f(y(t)) the Markovian
strategy is stationary (see, Dockner et al. 2000, Sect. 4.3). Typically, the feedback
closed-loop Markovian solution, which is the one we apply in the present analysis,
is obtained based on the Bellman equation.
In order to establish which is the most appropriate solution concept, it is essential
to evaluate the relevant information set used by players when they take their deci-
sions. In cases where collection of information over time is di¢ cult, it is reasonable
to model the choice according to the open-loop rule;20 on the contrary, when players
20One example from the education sector could be the Research Assessment Exercise in the UK,
9can observe the current state of the world and they behave accordingly, the closed-
loop rules are more appropriate. Arguably, closed-loop solutions are more appealing,
but solving for closed-loop is more di¢ cult. However, in some cases ￿and health
care markets can be a good example ￿players might have to commit to investment
plans and stick to them for long periods of time. In this case, the open-loop solution
might be the relevant one. Nevertheless, there is a wide range of problems where the
two solutions coincide.21 Below, we compare the Nash equilibria under the open-
loop and feedback (closed-loop) solution concepts. The next section provides the
open-loop Nash equilibrium, while Section 4 provides the feedback solution.
3 Open-loop solution
Consider ￿rst the case where the providers use open-loop decision rules. Provider








D(t) = ￿(D￿(t) ￿ D(t)); (8)
D(0) = D0 > 0; (9)
where qi is the control variable. Let ￿i(t) be the current value co-state variable
associated with the state equation. The current-value Hamiltonian is:22










where C (D;qi) is given by (7). The solution is given by (a) @Hi=@qi = 0 , (b)
:
￿i = ￿￿i ￿ @Hi=@D, (c)
:
D = @Hi=@￿i, or more extensively:
￿
2￿
￿i = ￿qi; (11)
:









that produces quality pro￿les of higher education institutions every 8 years. Arguably, with a time
span of this length, quality becomes observable only quite rarely.
21Games where this coincidence arises are presented in Clemhout and Wan (1974); Reinganum
(1982); Mehlmann and Willing (1983); Dockner, Feichtinger and Jłrgensen (1985). See also
Mehlmann (1988), Fershtman, Kamien and Muller (1992), Dockner, Jłrgensen, Van Long, Sorger
(2000, ch. 7) for reviews.
22The indication of time (t) is omitted to ease notation.
10to be considered along with the transversality condition limt!+1 e￿￿t￿i(t)D(t) = 0.
The second order conditions are satis￿ed if the Hamiltonian is concave in the control
and state variables (LØonard and Van Long, 1992).23









2￿ (￿i (￿ + ￿) ￿ (p ￿ ￿D)) = ￿
:
qi. Using ￿i = ￿qi
2￿
￿ , we obtain
:
qi = qi (￿ + ￿) ￿
￿
2￿￿
(p ￿ ￿D); (14)
which, together with (13), describe the dynamics of the equilibrium.
As to the possible steady state, setting
:








The locus of quality,
￿
qi = 0, is negatively sloped. The second locus around the steady
state (i.e. when qualities are symmetric), is
:
D = 0, or D = 1=2: each provider has
half of the market. The dynamics of quality and demand around the steady state


























where the 2-by-2 matrix is the Jacobian J of the dynamic system. As for the
dynamic properties of the system, it is immediate to check that the Jacobian matrix
J in (16) is such that tr(J) = ￿ > 0, and det(J) = ￿￿ (￿ + ￿) < 0, implying that
23This is the case since (a) Hqiqi = ￿￿ < 0; (b) HDD = ￿￿ < 0; (c) HDDHqiqi > (HDqi)
2 or
￿￿ > 0.




Figure 1. Equilibrium is a saddle point
dD/dt=0
D(0) D(0) 1/2
Let Ds = 1=2 be the steady state level of demand. Suppose we start o⁄ steady
state at a level where the initial demand is low: D(0) < Ds. One possible inter-
pretation is the case of a provider who at time 0 enters a previously monopolistic
market. The solution is then characterised by a period of increasing demand and
decreasing quality. Notice that the optimal solution for the ￿ incumbent￿is precisely
the opposite and it is equivalent to the case where the demand is high (D(0) < 1=2
() 1 ￿ D(0) > 1=2). For this provider, we should observe a period of decreasing
demand and increasing quality. These dynamic patterns establish our ￿rst main
result:
Proposition 1 If production costs are strictly convex in output, demand and quality
move in opposite directions over time on the equilibrium path to the steady state.
In the next section, we will show that the above result holds also when the players
use feedback decision rules. In an extension to the main model, we will also show
(Section 6) that this result is robust to the case of elastic market demand. Notice,
however, that the result in Proposition 1 holds only if the cost function is strictly
convex in output.
To grasp the intuition behind this result, it is useful to consider, as a benchmark
for comparison, the special case of linear production costs, ￿ = 0, implying that
24As shown in Appendix 1, the system is not only locally stable (around the steady state), but
also globally stable.
12the quality locus is horizontal at the steady state level of quality, qs. In this case,
if D(0) 6= 1=2, the two providers will immediately set their qualities at the steady
state level, qs, and maintain this quality level at all times. The demand dynamics,
(13), will then eventually bring demand to the steady state level, Ds = 1=2, with the
speed of adjustment depending of the degree of demand sluggishness. The reason
is that, with constant marginal cost of output (and ￿xed prices), marginal pro￿ts
(@￿i=@qi) are independent of output. Thus, the pro￿t-maximising choice of quality
is qs irrespective of demand, and each provider will therefore keep quality at this
level at each point in time.
On the other hand, when the cost function is strictly convex in output, ￿ > 0,
marginal pro￿ts depend on actual demand. More speci￿cally, for a given level of
quality, the marginal pro￿t gain of higher quality is monotonically decreasing in the
actual demand facing the provider, since new consumers are increasingly costly to
serve. Thus, if a provider faces actual demand D < Ds, he will set quality q > qs.
As demand increases along the equilibrium dynamic path, the marginal pro￿t gain
of quality decreases; consequently, the provider will gradually reduce quality until
the steady state level is reached. Obviously, the inverse logic applies for D > Ds.
We believe that the result in Proposition 1 has potential implications for em-
pirical analyses of the e⁄ect of quality on demand and, in turn, of the relationship
between competition and quality. In addition to the opposite movement of quality
and demand over time, notice that, at a given point in time, a comparison of the
two providers ￿o⁄the steady state ￿unambiguously predicts a negative relationship
between quality and demand. Thus, it is tempting to speculate that this type of
equilibrium dynamics could potentially lead to spurious relationships between qual-
ity and demand in empirical studies, unless su¢ cient care is taken to account for
endogeneity. Folland (1983), Luft et al. (1990), Burns and Wholey (1992), Hodgkin
(1996), Tay (2003) and Howard (2005) for example ￿nd that higher quality, as mea-
sured by outcome measures (like standardised mortality ratios and complication
rates) or process measures (like the ratio of sta⁄ per bed and the availability of
specialised services), increases the demand for hospital care. Our model suggests
that these estimates might be biased downwards as they may not take into account
the fact that higher demand may simultaneously reduce quality.
Finally, to obtain the steady state level of quality, we set
:
qi = 0, which, combined














If we consider the comparative statics properties of (17), the results are reasonable
and intuitive. If the price is above the marginal cost, then lower transportation costs
13(￿) or a higher price (p) increase quality. Similarly, a higher marginal cost of quality
(￿), a higher marginal cost of provision (￿) or a higher time preference discount rate
(￿) reduce quality. Steady state quality is also decreasing in the degree of demand
sluggishness (measured by ￿￿1). Notice that the steady state quality converges to
the equilibrium quality in a corresponding static model for ￿ ! 0 and ￿ ! 1. Thus,
the dynamic open-loop solution yields a lower level of steady state quality than
a corresponding static Nash equilibrium, and this di⁄erence is increasing with the
degree of demand sluggishness.
4 Feedback solution
In solving for the feedback solution, we restrict attention to stationary Markovian
strategies. More speci￿cally, we obtain a stationary Markovian Nash equilibrium in
linear strategies.25 The full derivation of the feedback solution is given in Appendix
2. The equilibrium dynamic decision rules are found to be given by:26
qi = ￿i(D) =
￿
2￿￿
(￿1 + ￿2D) (18)
and
qj = ￿j(D) =
￿
2￿￿
















2￿￿2 (  ￿ 2￿ ￿ ￿)








The quality di⁄erence at each point in time is thus given by









The ￿rst observation we want to highlight is the negative sign of ￿2, implying a
negative relationship between demand and quality over time along the equilibrium
25The strategy is said to be Markovian since the control at time t does not depend on the path
followed by the state until t, but only on the current value of the state; it is stationary since it
depends only on the current vaule of the state, and it is autonomous from the time t:
26To ease notation, we continue the practice of dropping time indications.
27The positive sign of ￿1 is explicitly con￿rmed in the Appendix.
14dynamic path. Thus, as previously mentioned, the result reported in Proposition
1 carries over to the feedback case, and the intuition is equivalent to the one given
in the previous section, for the open-loop case. Once more, notice that this result
holds only when the cost function is strictly convex in output, as ￿2 = 0 if ￿ = 0.
Applying the steady state condition Ds = 1=2 to (18)-(19), steady state quality
















Comparing the steady state equilibria of the open-loop and feedback solutions, we
see that, if production costs are linear in output (￿ = 0), implying ￿2 = 0, the
two solutions coincide: qF = qOL. Otherwise, if the cost function is strictly convex
in output (￿ > 0), implying ￿2 < 0, steady state quality is lower in the feedback
solution. The reason for the coincidence result is related to the previously discussed
implication of linear production costs, namely that the pro￿t margin becomes in-
dependent of output. This implies an absence of strategic interaction between the
two players that causes the two solution concepts to coincide. From (18)-(19), it is
straightforward to verify that the optimal dynamic decision rules imply that each
player sets quality at the steady state level at every point in time, irrespective of
the quality chosen by the other player.28
However, a cost function that is strictly convex in output (￿ > 0) introduces
a strategic interaction between the providers that implies that the optimal qual-
ity choice of provider j depends, at each point in time, on the actual demand of
provider j. More speci￿cally, qualities are strategic complements when ￿ > 0. The
intuition is the following: a quality increase by provider i will shift demand from
provider j to provider i. This causes a reduction in marginal production costs for
provider j. Since the price is constant, this leads to an increase in the pro￿t margin
of provider j, which, in turn, makes quality investments more pro￿table for this
provider. Thus, a quality increase from provider i will be strategically met by a
quality increase from provider j. This strategic complementarity establishes a pos-
itive relationship between qi and qj at each point in time in the optimal dynamic
decision rules.29 Moreover, notice that there exists an intertemporal strategic com-
plementarity between the variables, according to the de￿nition provided by Jun and
Vives (2004), as long as the control of a player responds positively to a change in
28Notice also that the game becomes ￿ linear state￿under ￿ = 0, and it is well known that open-
loop and closed-loop solutions coincide in such games (see, e.g., Dockner et al, 2000, Section 7.2).
29We can easily see this from (18)-(19) by noticing that D is increasing (decreasing) in qi (qj)
and that ￿2 < 0 when ￿ > 0.
15the state pertaining to the opponent (@qj=@D > 0; @qi=@(1 ￿ D) > 0).
The above explained strategic complementarity introduces an intertemporal trade-
o⁄ for the providers. When revising their quality choices according to the evolution
of actual demand, each provider knows that an increase in the quality level will
provoke a quality-increasing response by the competitor in the future. Thus, when
contemplating an increase in the quality level, each provider must weigh the instan-
taneous gain in market share against the future loss due to the strategic response by
the competitor. As long as the providers value future pro￿ts, this dynamic strategic
interaction leads to a lower steady state level of quality in the feedback equilibrium
(compared with the open-loop solution).30
The comparative statics properties of the feedback solution is qualitatively sim-
ilar to the open-loop case. It is relatively straightforward to show31 that more com-
petition ￿measured either by less demand sluggishness or lower transportation costs
￿will increase steady state quality. However, the strength of the quality responses
to increased competition di⁄er. We can measure the relative quality response to an




























￿(2￿ + ￿ + 5 )
  (4￿ + 5￿ +  )
; (27)
￿OL
￿ = 1; ￿F
￿ =
(2￿ + ￿)
2 + (4￿ + 5￿) 
  (4￿ + 5￿ +  )
: (28)




￿ for all parameter
con￿gurations. Thus, an increase in competition ￿either through less sluggish de-
mand or lower transportation costs ￿will have a stronger (weaker) impact on quality
if the players use open-loop (feedback) decision rules.
The following Proposition summarises the most important steady state charac-
teristics of the open-loop and feedback solutions:
30Notice that the strategic complementarity property is robust to relaxing the assumption of
symmetric locations. As long as quality has a business-stealing e⁄ect, and as long as production
costs are strictly convex in output, a quality increase by one provider will always increase the
incentive for the competitor to increase quality as well. This is also the case if market demand is
elastic, as we show in Section 6.
31See Appendix 2 for the details of the calculations.
16Proposition 2 (i) If production costs are linear in output, then qOL = qF.
(ii) If production costs are strictly convex in output, then qOL > qF.
(iii) Less sluggish demand and/or lower transportation costs will increase the
steady state level of quality under both solution concepts.
(iv) The positive impact of increased competition on quality is weaker in the
feedback equilibrium.
5 Welfare and policy implications
In this section we derive the welfare properties of our model and analyse optimal price
regulation. We start out by deriving the optimal (￿rst-best) quality in the steady
state solution and the corresponding optimal price for the two solution concepts.
Subsequently, we derive the optimal quality paths o⁄the steady state and show how
these can be implemented by dynamic price regulation. Finally, we brie￿ y discuss
other policy measures that could be undertaken to a⁄ect the provision of quality in
the market.
5.1 Optimal quality in the steady state
First-best quality in the steady state is derived by maximising (instantaneous) aggre-













































Maximising this expression with respect to qualities yields




which implies D = 1=2.
With competition along only one dimension, namely quality, the ￿rst-best steady
state level of quality can always be implemented by appropriate choice of the reg-
ulated price, p. Since equilibrium quality is monotonically increasing in the price,






















17Thus, if players use dynamic decision rules of the feedback type, more high-powered
incentives, in the form of higher regulated prices, are necessary to induce ￿rst-best
quality in the steady state.
5.2 Optimal dynamic price regulation
When demand is sluggish, the quality level given by (29) will typically not be optimal
o⁄the steady state, and neither will the steady state price rule given by (30). Instead
there will generally be a time dependent welfare maximising quality path that can
be implemented by an optimally chosen dynamic pricing rule. As before, we consider
the cases of open-loop and feedback behaviour.
5.2.1 Open-loop behaviour
Suppose that the regulator can directly set the providers quality levels at each point












D(t) = ￿(D￿(t) ￿ D(t)); (31)





(v + qi(t) ￿ ￿x)dx +
Z 1
D(t)














Let ￿(t) be the current value co-state variable associated with the state equation.




(v + qi ￿ ￿x)dx +
Z 1
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18The solution is given by (a) @H=@qi = 0, @H=@qj = 0, (b)
:
￿ = ￿￿ ￿ @H=@D, (c)
:




￿ = ￿qi; (35)
(1 ￿ D) ￿
￿
2￿
￿ = ￿qj; (36)
:









to be considered along with the transversality condition limt!+1 e￿￿t￿(t)D(t) = 0.
The above conditions are also su¢ cient if the H is concave in (qi;qj;D), which
requires that ￿ > 1
￿+￿.32
From (35) and (36), we ￿nd that ￿ = (￿qi ￿ D) 2￿
￿ = (1 ￿ D ￿ ￿qj)2￿
￿ , which
implies qj = 1























￿￿ (￿ + ￿)
￿ (￿ + ￿) ￿ ￿￿







Using again qj = 1
















￿ > 0. The ￿rst-best solution
is described in Figures 2 and 3. Notice that, in contrast with the equilibrium path
(under open-loop or feedback behaviour), it is possible that quality and demand
move together on the socially optimal path. This happens if the degree of production



















1 ￿1 ￿2(￿ + ￿)
3
5
is negative semide￿nite. This is true if ￿ >
1
￿+￿ .










Figure 3. First best. Case 2. quality decreasing over time
dD/dt=0
D(0) 1/2
In Figure 2 the provider with high initial demand starts from a low quality level
which increases over time towards the steady state. Contrastingly, in Figure 3 the
provider with high initial demand starts from a high quality level which decreases
towards the steady state. The intuition for these results relates to the following
20regulatory trade-o⁄: The provider with the higher initial demand has the higher
marginal production costs (if ￿ > 0). For this reason, the regulator has an incentive
to choose a low quality level for the high-demand provider in order to shift demand
towards the other provider, thereby improving allocative (cost) e¢ ciency. On the
other hand, consumers bene￿t more (in sum) from quality improvements by the
provider with the higher demand. Thus, considerations for aggregate consumer
utility indicate that the regulator should choose a high quality level for the high-
demand provider. Notice how the relative strengths of these two incentives depend
on the convexity of production costs (￿) and the degree of demand sluggishness. In
the extreme case of linear production costs (￿ = 0) the former incentive is eliminated,
implying that quality and demand always move together on the optimal dynamic
path (i.e., the provider with higher demand has always higher quality). Similarly, if
demand is extremely sluggish (￿ ! 0), reducing quality for the provider with high
initial demand has little or no e⁄ect on actual demand, e⁄ectively eliminating the
former incentive. Figure 2 illustrates the case where the former incentive dominates,






the two incentives exactly cancel each other and the optimal quality is constant over





D = 0, we obviously recover the solution
derived in the previous sub-section, where q￿ = 1
2￿ and D = 1
2.
Let us now see how the ￿rst-best quality paths can be implemented by dynamic
price regulation. This requires that the regulator can set di⁄erent time-dependent
prices for di⁄erent providers. Comparing the ￿rst-best solution (39) with the equi-
librium open-loop solution (14) for provider i, the ￿rst-best solution can be imple-
mented by setting the price
pOL
i (t) = ￿ +
￿





In the steady state, where D = 1=2, we recover the optimal price pOL given by
(30), which is obviously equal for both providers. An instructive way to express
the optimal time-dependent price is in the form of deviations from the steady-state
￿rst-best price. Using (30) and (41), the optimal dynamic price rule for provider i
is given by
pOL












[2D(t) ￿ 1]: (42)
Notice that if provider i has a high initial market share, i.e. D0 > 1
2, then the price







In order to provide an intuitive characterisation of the optimal dynamic pricing






, which implies a ￿rst-best
21quality level that is constant over time. In this case, the optimal price is given by
pOL
i (t) = pOL +
￿
2
[2D(t) ￿ 1] (43)
If the price is ￿xed, we know from the analysis in Section 3 that the provider with
high initial demand will provide low quality at the beginning and then increase
quality over time. Thus, to induce the ￿rst-best quality, which in this example is
constant over time, the regulator has to set a price above pOL at time zero and then
decrease the price over time, so that quality remains constant.
Assume that provider i has the higher initial demand. In general, there are then
three di⁄erent regimes to consider:






: First-best quality for provider i increases over time. The
optimal price for this provider starts out higher than the steady-state price















: First-best quality for provider i decreases (slowly)
over time. The optimal price for this provider still starts out higher than the
steady-state price and decreases over time along with the quality level.






: First-best quality for provider i decreases over time. The
optimal price for this provider now starts out lower than the steady-state
price and increases over time, while quality decreases.
Cases 1 and 3 are perhaps counter-intuitive. Case 1 (case 3) implies that reduc-
tions (increases) in prices over time are followed by increases (reductions) in quality.
This is in contrast to static models (or to steady-state comparative statics) where
an increase in price generates higher quality.
5.2.2 Feedback behaviour
In order to facilitate comparison with the feedback solution (Section 4) we can
solve for the ￿rst-best quality path using the Bellman equation rather than the
Hamiltonian. Using this approach (see Appendix 3 for details), the ￿rst-best quality







































































Consistent with the ￿rst-best solution derived from the Hamiltonian, it is easily
shown, from (44) and (46), that
@q￿
i








2 in (44) yields the ￿rst-best steady-state level q￿ = 1
2￿. Since (44)-(46)
describe the same dynamic path as (38) and (39), no further comments on this
solution are necessary.
Once more, the ￿rst-best solution can be implemented also under feedback be-
haviour, using time-dependent and ￿rm-speci￿c prices. Comparing the ￿rst-best
solution (44) with the equilibrium feedback solution (18) for provider i, the ￿rst-






































where ￿1 and ￿2 are given by (20) and (21), respectively. It is relatively straight-









(￿ + ￿) + (2￿ + ￿)








> (<)0 if ￿ < (>)b ￿:
In qualitative terms, this corresponds exactly with the optimal dynamic price rule







If production costs are su¢ ciently convex (high ￿), the optimal price for the high-
demand provider starts out a level that is lower than the steady-state price, and
then increases over time while demand decreases. Otherwise (low ￿), the high-
demand provider faces a starting price that is higher then the steady-state level. On
the equilibrium path to the steady state, the price is then gradually reduced while
demand increases.
235.3 Other policy measures
Besides price regulation, we can also think of other policy measures that could be
used in order to a⁄ect the providers￿supply of quality. For example, a policy maker
could take measures to reduce demand sluggishness in the market. One possible
way to achieve this would be to develop and publish frequently updated quality
indicators that increase consumers￿awareness of quality di⁄erences in the market.33
Since the providers￿incentives to provide quality increases with the regulated price
and decreases with the degree of demand sluggishness, notice that measures taken
to increase the amount of information available to consumers would be a policy
substitute to exposing the providers to high-powered incentive schemes (i.e., high
prices). The less sluggish demand is (i.e., the higher ￿ is), the lower is the optimal
price in the steady state.34
We have seen that, for given prices and demand sluggishness, equilibrium quality
depends on whether the providers use open-loop or feedback strategies, where quality
incentives are lower in the latter case. In principle, it could also be possible for a
policy maker to in￿ uence the strategic context that the providers face; i.e., whether
they ￿nd themselves in an open-loop or a feedback setting. Suppose that the policy
maker would like to increase the degree of competition between the providers. From
our previous analysis we know that this is equivalent to saying that the policy maker
would prefer the providers to play open-loop (rather than feedback) strategies. The
fundamental di⁄erence between the two decision rules is the degree of commitment.
Thus, any institutional arrangement that increases the degree of commitment could
make the providers￿strategic context more similar to the open-loop setting and
thereby induce quality decisions that are closer to the open-loop solution. One way
to do this could be to require that the providers (e.g., hospitals or universities)
make long-term investment plans with respect to quality that they have to commit
to. Presumably, the commitment e⁄ect will be stronger the longer the time horizon
of the required plans and the more detailed the plans are required to be. Obviously,
any potential gains of requiring such plans must be weighed against the costs, which
include a loss of ￿ exibility in the case of changing market conditions.
33The publication of hospital and school ￿ League Tables￿in the UK are examples of such policy
measures.
34From (30) we immediately see that p
OL is decreasing in ￿. It is relatively straightforward to
show that the same is true for p
F.
246 Extension: Elastic market demand
Suppose that consumers are distributed on the entire real line with a constant density
of 1. The two providers (i and j) are still located at 0 and 1, respectively. By this
formulation, three indi⁄erent consumers can be identi￿ed. The consumer who is
indi⁄erent between the two providers is located at b x, implicitly given by v+qi￿￿b x =
v + qj ￿ ￿ (1 ￿ b x). In addition, there are consumers who make the choice between
acquiring the good from the nearest provider and staying out of the market. In
the ￿ hinterland￿of provider i, the consumer who is indi⁄erent between these two
choices is located at b xi, implicitly given by v+qi+￿b xi = 0, while the corresponding
indi⁄erent consumer in the hinterland of provider j is located at b xj, implicitly given
by v + qj ￿ ￿ (b xj ￿ 1) = 0. Potential demand for provider i is then given by
D￿

























When the total demand is not ￿xed, the dynamic optimisation problem has two state
variables, Di and Dj. Thus, with open-loop behaviour, each provider maximises
discounted pro￿ts over the in￿nite time horizon, subject to two state equations:
:
Di(t) = ￿(D￿
i(t) ￿ Di(t)); (51)
:
Dj(t) = ￿(D￿
j(t) ￿ Dj(t)); (52)
along with some initial conditions. Letting ￿i(t) and ￿j (t) be the current value
co-state variables associated with the two state equations, the current-value Hamil-
tonian is

























25The solution is given by (a) @Hi=@qi = 0 , (b)
:
￿i = ￿￿i ￿ @Hi=@Di, (c)
:
￿j =
￿￿j ￿ @Hi=@Dj, (d)
:
D = @Hi=@￿i, or more extensively:
3￿
2￿
￿i = ￿qi; (54)
:
￿i = ￿i (￿ + ￿) ￿ (p ￿ ￿Di); (55)
:












to be considered along with the transversality condition limt!+1 e￿￿t￿i(t)Di(t) = 0.









2￿ (￿i (￿ + ￿) ￿ (p ￿ ￿Di)) = ￿
:




qi = qi (￿ + ￿) ￿
3￿ (p ￿ ￿Di)
2￿￿
; (58)
which, together with (57), describe the dynamics of the equilibrium.
Setting
:








As before, the locus of quality,
￿
qi = 0, is negatively sloped. The second locus around
the steady state is
:
Di = 0, or Di = 1
2 +
v+qi











This is quite intuitive, since we now allow quality to have a market expanding e⁄ect.
Nevertheless, it is easily con￿rmed that the result in Proposition 1 still holds: quality









(￿ (2p ￿ ￿) ￿ 2v￿)￿




3p￿ + ￿￿ (￿ + ￿)(2v + ￿)
3￿￿ + 2￿￿2 (￿ + ￿)
: (62)
An interior solution (qi > 0) requires that p is su¢ ciently high relative to ￿ and v. If
marginal production costs are constant (￿ = 0) we always have an interior solution
as long as the price-cost margin is positive (p > 0).
It is also worth noticing that the relationship between transportation costs and
26steady state quality is now ambiguous if ￿ > 0, as is easily con￿rmed from (61).
The reason is that, when total demand is elastic, ￿ is no longer a ￿ pure￿competition
measure but also a⁄ects total demand. A reduction of ￿ will increase demand from
the monopolistic segments (consumers located in the ￿ hinterlands￿ ), which increases
the marginal cost of treatment (if ￿ > 0). All else equal, the optimal response for
each provider is to dampen this demand increase by reducing quality. With constant
marginal cost of treatment this e⁄ect vanishes and lower transportation costs always
lead to higher quality.
6.2 Feedback solution
When market demand is elastic, a full analytical derivation of the feedback solution
is no longer feasible. We will therefore derive the solution as function of the price
only, where we choose the following numerical values for the remaining parameters:
￿ = ￿ = v = ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1
2 and ￿ = 0:95.
In Appendix 4, we show that, with the above parameterisation, the equilibrium




(3￿1 ￿ ￿3 + (3￿2 ￿ ￿5)Di + (3￿5 ￿ ￿4)Dj); (63)
where
￿1 := 0:6167p ￿ 0:2182; ￿2 := ￿0:4555; (64)
￿3 := 0:0283p ￿ 0:0174; ￿4 := ￿0:0010; ￿5 := ￿0:0157: (65)
As in the open-loop solution, the negative dynamic relationship between quality and
demand is preserved, as 3￿2 ￿ ￿5 < 0.
In the steady state, quality is given by
qF = 0:3376p ￿ 0:5063; (66)
while demand is D = 0:9937 + 0:3376p. Using the same parameterisation in (61),
the corresponding steady state quality level in the open-loop solution is given by
qOL = 0:3409p ￿ 0:5114: (67)
Comparing the two solutions, we ￿nd that qOL > qF if p > 1:4970. Since an interior
solution (q > 0) requires p > 1:5, the result from this numeric example is in line with
our previous conclusion, that steady state quality is lower in the feedback solution
than in the open-loop solution. With elastic market demand, it follows that steady
state output is also lower in the feedback solution.
27Although the inability to derive a full analytical solution restricts the generality
of the analysis, we have no reason to believe that qualitatively di⁄erent results could
be obtained with other parameter con￿gurations. The reason is that the key feature
of the model ￿ qualities being strategic complements ￿ is una⁄ected by whether
market demand is elastic or not.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper, we have analysed the impact of competition on quality in a market
with regulated prices and sluggish demand. The basic model is the widely used
Hotelling model where products are horizontally and (potentially) vertically di⁄er-
entiated. We have considered the case in which the spatial locations are exogenously
￿xed, while ￿rms choose quality. These choices are studied within a dynamic frame-
work, where demand responds to quality changes with some degree of sluggishness,
implying a divergence between actual and potential demand (out of steady state).
We would like to stress that our assumptions ￿t quite well with the features of mar-
kets with regulated price ￿let us think of education or health: the spatial locations
of providers are given; competition among providers is based mainly on the product
quality; prices play a limited role in the competitive process; the consumer behavior
is characterised by a certain degree of stickiness.
Using a di⁄erential-game approach, we have derived the open-loop and the feed-
back (closed-loop) solutions. In the open-loop solution, each provider knows the
quality of the competitor in the initial state, and chooses the time path of quality
e⁄orts at the beginning, and then stick to this plan for the whole length of the
game. In the feedback solution, each provider knows the quality of the competitor,
not only in the initial state, but also in all subsequent periods, and thus can choose
the quality e⁄ort at each point in time, possibly responding to quality changes by
the competitor. Speci￿cally, we have found the feedback closed-loop Markovian so-
lution, in which the current choice of each player depends on the current value of
the state variables.
The analysis has provided two main ￿ndings, both of which relate to the case
of strictly convex production costs. First, we found (under both solution concepts)
a negative relationship between quality and demand o⁄ the steady state, which is
contrary to the static relationship. The reason is that the marginal pro￿t gain
is decreasing in quality. Second, we showed that the feedback solution results in
lower quality than the open-loop solution. On the other hand, if production costs
are linear in output, the two solutions coincide. Once again, the reason for such
results is that with strictly convex production costs, quality choices are strategic
28complements, while with linear production costs they are strategically independent.
Thus, when ￿rms can observe (and respond to) the competitors￿quality at any time
period, and quality choices are strategic complements, quality will be lower.
Regarding social welfare, we have shown how a regulator in principle can im-
plement the ￿rst-best quality paths by dynamic price regulation, choosing time-
dependent and ￿rm-speci￿c prices. The regulator might also use non-price instru-
ments to induce more socially preferable outcomes. For example, our analysis of
the open-loop versus feedback solutions shows that by forcing ￿rms to stick to long-
term investment plans (i.e., to adopt open-loop rules in terms of di⁄erential game
theory), lower monetary incentives (i.e., prices) are needed to reach the ￿rst-best
quality level, compared with the situation in which ￿rms can make quality choices
at each point in time. Moreover, if demand sluggishness could be a⁄ected by the
regulator, for instance, by public disclosure of quality indicators, then this would
also be a policy substitute to high-powered incentives.
We ￿nd this analysis relevant for several regulated industries, especially health
care and education. In these markets, quality is a major concern, and prices are
less crucial when consumers choose a provider. Many European governments have
introduced (elements of) competition in health care and education in order to stim-
ulate quality. In the US competition has been in place for many years. Recently, we
have seen a trend in both the US and in Europe towards publishing quality rankings
(league tables) of hospitals, universities, schools, etc. Obviously, this is done to stim-
ulate demand responses to quality di⁄erences. The purpose of our paper has been
to analyse the impact of competition on quality in regulated markets when demand
is not responding instantaneously to quality di⁄erences. Hopefully, our analysis can
shed some light on the recent reforms in health care and education.
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1. Global stability
The dynamics of qualities and demand derived in Section 2 are:
:
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There are two positive eigenvalues (￿ + ￿ > 0,
￿+￿￿
2￿ > 0) and a negative one
(￿
￿￿￿￿







+ 4￿2￿ (￿ + ￿), which implies full
stability, i.e. there is only one admissible path which leads to the steady state.
Moreover, de￿ne Q := qi￿qj. Then, we can re-write the dynamics of the system as:
:









2 ￿ D +
Q
2￿). A phase diagram analysis in the
(Q;D) space reveals that if D(0) > Ds, then Q < 0, and qi < qj: the provider with
higher initial demand provides lower quality. The dynamics described in Figure 1 is
therefore also global.
2. The feedback solution in the basic framework
Provider i￿ s instantaneous objective function is








in which time index is suppressed to ease notation. Eq.(A1), together with the linear
dynamic constraint, (4), gives rise to a linear-quadratic problem. Hence, we de￿ne
the value function of provider i as
V i(D) = ￿0 + ￿1D + (￿2=2)D2; (A2)
implying V i
D(D) = ￿1 + ￿2D. Notice that ￿2 < 0 is required to ensure concavity of
the value function, and hence stability of the strategies.
The optimal investment strategies are functions of actual demand at each point
in time. Thus, we de￿ne qi = ￿i(D) and qj = ￿j(D). We are focusing on stationary
Markovian linear strategies. The value function has to satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation, which, for provider i, is given by
￿V i(D) = max
￿


















34Maximisation of the right-hand-side yields ￿￿qi+V i
D
￿
2￿ = 0, which, after substitution
of V i
D, yields
qi = ￿i(D) =
￿
2￿￿
(￿1 + ￿2D): (A4)
By symmetry, the optimal investment strategy for provider j is given by
qj = ￿j(D) =
￿
2￿￿
(￿1 + ￿2(1 ￿ D)); (A5)








Notice that quality of provider i is higher than quality of provider j if demand is
lower than half of the market (assuming ￿2 < 0).
Substituting qi = ￿i(D), qj = ￿j(D) and V i
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4￿￿2 = 0; (A7)
￿






















D2 = 0: (A9)













The condition that the value function be concave leads us to select the negative root;















In order to establish the sign of ￿1, notice that the numerator in (A11) is monoton-
ically increasing in ￿2.35 Furthermore, it is straightforward to verify that @￿2
@￿ > 0
and @￿2
@￿ < 0. An interior solution requires that price is higher than marginal
production costs. Thus, ￿2 approaches its lowest permissible value if ￿ ! 0 and
































, which is unambiguously positive. Thus, we
conclude that ￿1 is positive for all permissible parameter con￿gurations.







, which, after substitu-
















where ￿2 < 0 is given by the negative root in (A10). The comparative statics



































+ 24￿￿2￿￿(3￿ + 2￿)
# < 0; (A14)






3. First-best quality using the Bellman equation
Instantaneous social welfare is given by
Z D
0
(v + qi ￿ ￿x)dx+
Z 1
D

















We de￿ne the value function of provider i as







2D. Notice that ￿0
2 < 0 is required to ensure concavity
of the value function. The optimal investment strategies are functions of actual
demand at each point in time. Thus, we de￿ne qi = ￿i(D) and qj = ￿j(D). The
value function has to satisfy the Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which,
for the regulator, is given by






























36Maximisation of the right-hand-side yields D ￿￿qi +VD
￿
2￿ = 0 and (1￿D)￿￿qj ￿
VD
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Substituting qi = ￿i(D), qj = ￿j(D), V i
D(D) = ￿0
1 +￿0
2D and V i(D) into (A17), we
obtain















































































































The condition that the value function be concave leads us to select the negative root.
4. Elastic market demand (feedback solution)
We de￿ne the value function of provider i as
V i(Di;Dj) = ￿0 + ￿1Di + (￿2=2)D2
i + ￿3Dj + (￿4=2)D2
j + ￿5DiDj; (A23)
implying V i
Di = ￿1+￿2Di+￿5Dj, V
j
Dj = ￿1+￿2Dj +￿5Di and V i
Dj = ￿3+￿4Dj +
￿5Di. Notice that ￿2 < 0 is required to ensure concavity of the value functions.
The optimal investment strategies are functions of actual demand at each point
in time: qi = ￿i(Di;Dj) and qj = ￿j(Dj;Di). The value function has to satisfy the
37Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation, which, for provider i, is given by


































Maximisation of the right-hand-side yields ￿qi = V i
Di
3￿
2￿ ￿ V i
Dj
￿
2￿, which, after sub-
stitution of V i
Di and V i
Dj, yields the optimal dynamic decision rule for provider i:
qi = ￿i (Di;Dj) =
￿
2￿￿
(3￿1 ￿ ￿3 + (3￿2 ￿ ￿5)Di + (3￿5 ￿ ￿4)Dj); (A25)
with a symmetric expression for the optimal decision rule of provider j. Substituting
qi = ￿i(Di;Dj), qj = ￿j(Dj;Di), V i
Di and V i
Dj into (A24), we obtain
￿V i(Di;Dj) =
8
> > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > :
T + pDi ￿ ￿
2
￿ ￿










































> > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > ;
(A26)
At this point, we need to attach some numerical values to the parameters of the
model in order to obtain a solution. Setting ￿ = ￿ = v = ￿ = 1, ￿ = 1
2 and ￿ = 0:95,





















































































































38For the equality to hold, the terms in brackets in the above equation must be
equal to zero. Since the last three terms only depend on ￿2, ￿4 and ￿5, we start by




































































There are six possible solutions:
8
> > > > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > > > :
[￿2 = 3:9951; ￿4 = ￿0:4800; ￿5 = 2:3900];
[￿2 = 0:3924; ￿4 = 0:9675; ￿5 = ￿0:9275];
[￿2 = ￿0:4555; ￿4 = ￿0:0010; ￿5 = ￿0:0157];
[￿2 = 2:5681; ￿4 = 2:8403; ￿5 = 2:9188];
[￿2 = 1:8194; ￿4 = ￿2:3528; ￿5 = ￿1:4563];
[￿2 = 4:8430; ￿4 = 0:4885; ￿5 = 1:4782]:
9
> > > > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > > > ;
(A28)
We choose the solution with negative ￿2, as this is required for the value function
to be concave. We still need to compute ￿1 and ￿3. Using the second and third




























Inserting the values of ￿2, ￿4 and ￿5 found above, the solution is
￿1 = 0:6167p ￿ 0:2182; ￿3 = 0:0283p ￿ 0:0174: (A29)
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